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Abstract 
The unprecedented economic turbulence of 2008 has raised questions about the efficacy of the 
oversight of banks and other financial institutions around the world. While the crisis of 2008 is 
unprecedented, the interrelationship between psychology and regulatory changes is similar in 
bank runs to what was seen in the recent financial crisis. This paper looks at some historical 
examples of runs on banks and other financial crises to cast light on the weaknesses, but also the 
strengths of the current systems. The paper gives an overview of some theoretical analyses of 
bank runs but also looks at several historical examples which show some of the contrast between 
theory and practical experience. Bank runs may in some instances appear to be isolated events, 
but they have often been harbingers of broader international problems as in 1873 or in the early 
1930‟s. Historical examples have shown that governments and regulators are capable of solving 
problems that have already occurred, for example the Savings and Loan Crisis in the late „80‟s, 
but have been less successful at anticipating the results of regulatory and technological change, 
i.e., the growth of derivatives and mortgage-backed securities. Consequently it would appear to 
be useful to spend more time looking at recent bank panics to get a better understanding of how 
financial markets and financial intermediaries can affect one another.  
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of bank runs is as old as banking.  This paper looks at the problem against the 
backdrop of the collapse of financial markets in 2008 with an eye to see if bank runs can shed 
some light on why markets reacted as they did, since the mass psychology of a bank run has 
certain similarities with a market panic.  While there can be no direct parallel between bank runs 
and certain similarities do suggest that the potential for panics are inherent in all financial 
markets and that - as with bank runs – panics can be exacerbated by exogenous, often politically 
driven factors.  Hence, knowing more about bank runs should help in the consideration of the 
implications of the present financial crisis.  
The ever present threat of bank runs has been an issue that has influenced economies since the 
advent of modern banking. Due to the nature of banking, the depositor‟s funds are not in the 
bank vaults at the free disposal of the depositors, but rather invested in the money market, out on 
loan or as was the case more recently, in mortgage-backed securities. Only a fraction of the 
deposits are held as bank reserves, thus most modern banks are able to accommodate 
withdrawals from a minority of the depositors. To date no bank has been able to cover the 
withdrawals of the majority of its depositors, thus making bank runs a dangerous situation for 
banks to be in.  
Particularly the earliest banking houses had to plan for the potential damage that such events 
could cause and strive to prevent them from occurring. History is awash with bank runs that 
devastated economies and close calls that were narrowly averted thanks to a number of 
countermeasures meant to reestablish confidence and stop or prevent runs. Bank runs had been 
widespread up until the establishment of central banks and deposit insurance.  
With the establishment of such regulatory/government organizations, whose objective it is to 
stabilize the banking sector and to prevent the negative fallout that results from banking panics, 
the threat of bank runs had been largely diminished. For more than half a century, bank runs 
were something modern economics dealt with in economic theory, but rarely faced in practice.  
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The last decade has seen a resurgence of bank runs and loss of consumer confidence in 
developed economies, giving economists a chance to study the effects of, and policies against 
bank runs in an empirical way. With economics becoming increasingly global, negative shocks 
that trigger loss of confidence in the banking sectors have become more prevalent and difficult to 
avoid, increasing the importance of preventative measures in economic policy. This shift has led 
to a number of high profile government interventions in banking crises over the last few years.  
New media, such as the internet, have led to a number of new possibilities to combat 
misinformation and panic in the banking sector. It has, however, opened up a number of new 
channels that can be affected by and lead to bank runs.  
The recent 2007-2009 crisis has given rise to a new crisis that shows many similarities to old-
fashioned bank runs in the sense that investors began a run on the stock markets, fueled, in the 
same way as in conventional bank runs, by panic, incomplete and sometimes incorrect 
information, spreading contagion and causing otherwise healthy companies to face financial ruin. 
The current crisis is at the same time similar to the Great Depression in scope, but 
simultaneously entirely different in the sense that during the Great Depression bank runs caused 
stock crashes, now the stock market crisis and the sub-prime mortgage crisis caused bank runs.  
Analyzing the causes of bank runs and the mass psychology involved could prove a useful tool 
for policy makers in determining how to react and how to prevent further crises of the type we 
are experiencing now.   
 
Historical Overview 
The following section gives a brief overview of the role banks have traditionally filled in the 
economy and how that role has changed over the centuries, with special attention given to the 
differences between European and American banking.  
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Economic Role of Banks 
To understand the cause and effects of bank runs on the economy one must first understand the 
role banks play in our modern economy. The term “bank” is used to refer to a number of 
different financial institutions, ranging from the traditional savings banks to trust companies, 
depository institutions or savings and loan associations.  
Generally banks accept deposits and make loans, making them financial intermediaries. Deposits 
are the funds customers leave in the bank with the condition that they can take back the funds 
deposited at a later date and loans are the funds banks lend to borrowers that are to be paid back 
at a later date with interest. Banks acquire funds by issuing liabilities (for example deposits) and 
those funds are generally used to acquire income-earning assets.  
There are a number of different liabilities issued by banks, ranging from checkable deposits, 
which are depositor assets that the bank is obliged to pay when withdrawn by the depositors. 
Generally checkable deposits are the lowest-cost source of bank funds for banks, as depositors 
are willing to accept lesser interest rates in return for liquidity. Such deposits result in costs for 
the bank in the form of interest and service costs such as providing tellers, and processing 
monthly statements. The next form of bank liabilities is the non-transaction deposit which makes 
up the largest portion of bank funds. Non-transaction deposits such as savings accounts generate 
higher interest for depositors as they are not as liquid as checkable deposits. The next form of 
liabilities that banks have access to are the borrowings from the Federal Reserve or other banks 
and corporations. The importance of borrowings has increased over the last decades becoming an 
important source of bank funds. Bank capital is the last category of liabilities open to banks. 
Bank capital can be accessed by selling new stock from retained earnings.  
The funds a bank earns by issuing liabilities are used to acquire income-earning assets. A part of 
the funds is held in the form of reserves due to reserve requirements set forth by the central 
banks. The reserve requirements state a required reserve ratio which dictates what percentage of 
demand deposit liabilities must be held in reserve by a bank to cover deposits. Additionally many 
banks hold excess reserves to help meet any further obligations that require liquid assets. 
Reserves do not earn interest for banks and thus they are only as large as absolutely necessary 
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(which becomes especially relevant when discussing bank runs). One way for banks to earn 
interest on their assets is to hold securities. Depending on what type of securities a bank holds, 
they have a varying degree of liquidity. Government securities tend to be very liquid, as they can 
be sold with only minor transaction costs and thus they are often referred to as secondary 
reserves. The dominant method of making profit for banks is by issuing loans. While loans do 
provide income for banks, they are rather illiquid as the loans cannot be converted to cash until 
the loan matures. This also goes hand in hand with an increased risk and thus banks charge high 
interest on loans, making them the highest interest earning assets that banks generally possess.   
It is difficult to determine the beginnings of banking. As early as ancient Babylon there was a 
form of banking that was regulated by the Code of Hammurabi. The roots of present-day banking 
can be assumed to begin with the trading families of the medieval Italian city-states of Genoa, 
Florence and Venice.
1
 The trading families set up early banks to complement their general 
activities and loaned money to royalty to help them fund wars and other cost intensive ventures.
2
  
Such banks fulfilled the role of facilitating trade more than making a profit from loans, as by 
papal decree, charging interest (usury) was prohibited. The early banks allowed merchants to be 
able to travel without large sums of money that required substantial expenditure on protection 
from brigands, as they could redeem notes of credit at banking houses at their destination, thus 
facilitating trade. Larger, more established, trading families circumvented the decree by using 
different currencies and varying exchange rates to earn a form of interest on loans.
3
  
In our modern economy, banks have gone beyond the basic actions of accepting deposits and 
offering loans. Most banks allow customers to pay bills using their bank accounts, process 
payments via internet banking. Banks also issue checks and bank drafts and lend money via 
overdraft. They also provide letters of credit, guarantees, and securities underwriting 
commitments, as well as safekeeping of documents and other valuables in safe deposit boxes. A 
majority of banks offers currency exchange and offer a broad variety of financial products.  
                                                          
1
  (Ferguson, 2008) 
2
 (Davies, 1994) 
3
 (Goldthwaite, 1995) 
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These activities give banks a central role in the modern payment system. Contributing to banking 
sector‟s central role in the global economy is the fact that banks are one of the primary sources of 
consumer loans as well as business financers, which also makes them key instruments of the 
government‟s monetary policy.4   
By allowing customers to pay via their bank accounts and by giving out loans, banks contribute 
to money movement and the velocity of money. The velocity of money is influenced by the way 
individuals conduct transactions. By using credit cards and charge accounts, less money is 
needed when making purchases or transactions thus increasing the velocity of money which is 
the average number of times per year that a dollar is spent in buying the total amount of goods 
and services produced in the economy.
5
 They also have the ability to create money using their 
excess reserves.  
Banks are required by law to keep reserves that are used to cover any withdrawals made by 
depositors. These reserves are divided into three categories. The first two categories, the primary 
and secondary reserves, are mandated. The primary reserves required by the central bank (in the 
U.S. the Federal Reserve) are kept in the form of cash and deposits due from other banks.
6
  The 
secondary reserves are slightly less liquid assets held to cover short-term cash needs. These 
reserves are typically held in the form of government bonds.
7
 
The level of reserves a bank must keep is regulated by national law and varies from country to 
country. In the U.S. the reserve ratio is set by the Federal Reserve and is currently around 10% 
for larger banks.
8
 In the European Union the required amount to be held by each institution is 
determined as a function of the institution‟s reserve base. The reserve base is defined as liability 
items on the institution‟s balance sheet, including deposits and debt securities issued. As of 2009 
this reserve ratio is at 2 per cent. The percentage of reserves that must be kept at the central bank 
or in the bank‟s own vault and any funds beyond the mandated reserves are known as the excess 
                                                          
4
 (Department of Banking, 2009) 
5
  (Mishkin, 2007) p.494 
6
 (Department of Banking, 2009) 
7
 (Department of Banking, 2009) 
8
  (Federal Reserve Board, 2008) 
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reserves. These excess reserves are how banks increase money supply. Due to the multiplier 
effect these reserves can increase the money supply. As the multiplier effect depends on the 
amount of excess reserves a bank holds, the central bank can expand or contract the money 
supply by changing the minimum reserve requirements.
9
 A threat of sudden cash demands as 
created during bank runs or possible loan losses can cause a bank to increase their reserves, 
which in turn lowers the multiplier effect and thus the money supply. Should such an increase in 
reserves not be confined to one bank but to a large part of the financial market, it can lead to the 
drying up of liquidity, also known as a “credit crunch”, due to the reduction in money banks 
have to lend.  
The money multiplier and credit is how banks boost the economy and both aspects are affected 
by the banks‟ capital structure.10 Banks in the OECD, however, are mostly privately owned 
institutions that operate on a for-profit basis and as such need to make profit themselves. This is 
done through a number of different methods. Conventionally, banks have made their profit off of 
the difference between the interest they pay depositors and the interest they charge on loans. This 
is referred to as “the spread” which has recently been responsible for around two thirds of bank 
revenue.
11
 A further method of making money is off of the securities banks hold as reserves. 
Lastly, modern banks earn fees for customer services ranging from the sales of financial 
products, such as mutual funds, to services such as financial counseling. The profit banks make 
in the U.S. is slightly over 1% of their asset value
12
 yearly, which is referred to as their “return 
on assets” (ROA).  
In our modern economy, a number of different financial institutions, such as credit unions and 
investment banks, have started to offer elements of more traditional banking. This increases the 
competition and leads banks to offer depositors and lenders more competitive interest rates.  
 
                                                          
9
 (Department of Banking, 2009) 
10
 (Diamond & Rajan, 2000) p.2431 
11
  (Mishkin, 2007) p.223 
12
 (Department of Banking, 2009) 
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Differences between the Role of American and European Banks 
 
When speaking of banking, it is important to remember that the banking systems and the 
importance of banks varies widely. There are large differences between the roles of banks in the 
U.S. and the Euro area, and even within the Euro area itself. Figure 1 indicates that countries in 
the Euro area are much more reliant on bank financing than the U.S., whereas the U.S. relies 
much more heavily on stock market capitalization and uses more debt securities issued by the 
corporate sector than Europe does. The amount of bank assets also suggests that in the traditional 
role of banks, as financiers of the corporate sector, banks are more important in Europe than in 
the United States.
13
 In the context of banking it is however important to note that the concept of a 
European or a U.S. bank is outdated as most large banks operate multi-nationally.  
 
This fact may seem counter-intuitive given the impact of the 2008 crash, which started with the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis in the U.S., but in fact the impact of banking problems in European 
economies confirms the importance of banks to the economic activity in Europe.  
 
Figure 1 Financial structure in the US and the Euro area in % of GDP (1999)
14
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre, & Worms, 2001) p.7 
14
 (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre, & Worms, 2001) p.7 
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While Figure 1 provides some statistics governing the banking in Europe and the U.S., one can 
assume that within Europe, there are a number of large differences in the importance and 
function of the banking system. Figure 2 gives us a clearer picture of the differences in the 
banking sectors, focusing on a number of factors such as the tenor of the loans given out by 
banks or the flexibility of their rates. In Italy, for example, the maturity of bank loans is 
comparatively short, increasing the importance of deposits for Italian banks in contrast to other 
European counterparts. At the same time, Italian firms use only a tenth of the debt finance that 
French companies do, which is most likely a result of the shorter period to maturity discussed 
above.
15
 Additionally, according to the Herfindahl index, the national market concentration in 
Germany is much lower than in France, while at the same time the five largest banks of both 
countries have similar market shares. This implies that the German banking system has many 
small banks that are largely affiliated in a network.
16
 
What is particularly important when discussing bank runs is the deposit insurance and state 
influence on the banking system. While countries such as Ireland have a weak state influence on 
the banking system, the majority (excluding Spain) of larger European nations have a relatively 
strong influence on the banking system in the form of public ownership of banks. This is 
different from the United States where state influence has traditionally been much less 
pronounced.  
Figure 2 also suggests some European countries‟ system of deposit insurance, which is 
particularly relevant in preventing bank runs. The higher the insurance, the less likely a run is, as 
depositors can be assured that they will receive their money. Higher insurance, however, does 
have the negative consequence of increasing moral hazard, as the insurer, not the bank carries the 
risk of financial mismanagement. If highly insured the banks have an incentive to invest in risky 
assets that offer higher returns as they would profit from the higher returns and the negative 
consequences that such risky investments may carry fall upon the insurer via deposit insurance. 
Of course this effect only works as long as the country itself is solvent and the depositors believe 
that the deposits can be covered.  
                                                          
15
 (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre, & Worms, 2001) p.7 
16
 (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre, & Worms, 2001) p.8 
9 
 
Figure 2 The structure of European financial systems17 
 
With this information in mind, one can look at the number of bank failures in recent history. In 
the U.S., bank failures occur much more frequently than in the Euro area with the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reporting over 1500 bank failures in the period between 
1980 and 1994. In contrast there have been only around 50 bank failures in Germany since 
1966.
18
  
  
                                                          
17
 (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre, & Worms, 2001) p.14 
18
 (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre, & Worms, 2001) p. 16 
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Bank Runs 
Bank regulation is largely based on solving a particular set of problems, rather than being an 
abstract theory. In other words, regulations develop based on what went wrong previously, as in 
the U.S. Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis of the 80‟s and 90‟s, during which a large number of 
S&L associations failed. Or, as is frequently said of generals, they are always ready to fight the 
last war, rather than the one they are fighting.  
While regulatory policy in the U.S. had seen the end of bank runs after the Great Depression due 
to the introduction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, recent events have seen a 
resurgence of bank runs in the U.S. and other OECD countries due in large part to the crisis of 
2007-2009. The following figure shows the number of bank failures in the U.S. since 1934 up 
until early 2009. One can clearly see the S&L crisis in the 80‟s and 90‟s. Remarkably there were 
no bank runs during that time. Only as recently as 2007 has the U.S. seen bank runs return. One 
can assume that this is due to the uncertain environment with the backdrop of the current 
financial crisis. To further examine the reasons behind the resurgence of banks runs the 
following sections will deal with the theory behind bank runs.  
Figure 3 Bank Failures 1934-2009
19
 
 
                                                          
19
 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2009) 
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What is a bank run?  
According to the theory set up by the academics Diamond and Dybvig, a bank run is a “common 
feature of the extreme crises that have played a prominent role in monetary history”20, which is 
defined by depositors rushing to withdraw their deposits due to an expected bank failure. The 
more depositors rush to withdraw their deposits, fearing that the bank will not be able to cover 
the deposits, the higher the likelihood of a bank default becomes and this, in turn, encourages 
more depositors to run on the bank demanding withdrawal. This scenario can destabilize an 
otherwise healthy bank to the point where it faces bankruptcy.
21
 Such a large scale and sudden 
withdrawal of capital can force banks to liquidate assets. This is in direct reaction to the large 
depositor demand and generally happens over a very brief time period. Due to a large part of 
bank assets being not easily liquefiable, the sale of such assets generally is made at a loss and 
causes the bank to fail.
22
 To explain what leads to bank runs and their effects, Diamond and 
Dybvig created a model describing banking transactions.  
The model set forth by Diamond and Dybvig adds banks to an economy that consists of a 
number of agents that have set funds at t=0 (let us assume US$1 per agent), who try and 
maximize their utility over two periods (t1 and t2).
23
 The agents have the opportunity to invest 
their funds in a project that leads to returns of over $1 at period 2 or only $1 if it is liquidated 
early, in t1, resulting in no gains. As the gains are zero if liquidated early, one can refer to the 
investment being illiquid, as is assumed by Diamond and Dybvig.
24
 The agents can be divided 
into two differing types. On the one hand there are the patient agents who gain utility from 
consuming in time period 2, and on the other hand there are the impatient agents who gain utility 
from consuming in period 1. What type of utility an agent derives from consuming, is unknown 
to the agents until t1 at which point the agents become aware of their utility functions they are. 
The impatient agents would then naturally liquidate their investment and regain their dollar. The 
patient agents on the other hand would wait until the investment reached maturity to earn the full 
                                                          
20
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.401 
21
 (Diamond D. W., Banks and liquidity creation: a simple exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig model, 2007) 
22
 (Diamond & Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 2000) p.15  
23
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.405 
24
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.405 
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payoff of the project in t2. This means that it is advantageous to be a patient agent as the project 
needs time to reach maturity. The impatient agents suffer from unexpected liquidity needs thus 
necessitating them turning their illiquid assets into liquid assets and thus, forfeiture of higher 
returns. This leads agents in such a market to have an incentive to find a form of “liquidity 
insurance” to protect them from the negative effect of having unexpected liquidity needs.25  
At this point Diamond and Dybvig introduce banking contracts as such a means of insuring the 
agents from unexpected liquidity needs. This takes the form of bank deposits (liquid bank 
liabilities) in which agents can invest their money at t=0. At this point the funds are then invested 
in the project by the bank. In period one, as in the example without banking contracts, the agents 
are informed of their liquidity needs, i.e. become aware of the fact whether they are patient or 
impatient agents, gaining utility from consuming in period one or two, respectively. The 
impatient agents then promptly head to the bank to withdraw their money, with each agent 
withdrawing gaining their initial investment ($1) plus interest. Due to the fact that there should, 
in theory, always be patient agents among the depositors, not all the initial funds need to be paid 
out and the deposits made by the agents that do not withdraw at t1 can be held until they reach 
maturity.  At t2 the investment reaches maturity and the returns of the mature investment can be 
paid out to the patient agents. In this case however, the patient agents don‟t receive the full 
period two return they would have achieved had they not deposited their money in the bank but 
directly invested in the project, as the bank funds the interest paid out to the impatient agents 
with the returns made in period two. The patient agents do receive higher returns than the 
impatient agents and have an incentive to deposit their money in the bank at t0, as they do not 
become aware of their preference until t1 and can thus “insure” themselves at the cost of slightly 
diminished returns in t2 via the bank.
26
  
A number of aspects complicate the model. The information as to the liquidity needs of the 
agents is not only determined in t1, but also private information that the banks have no access to. 
This means that information is asymmetric. Additionally, the bank serves agents sequentially.
27
 
                                                          
25
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.407 
26
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.408 
27
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.408 
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Sequentially implies that the bank serves on a first come, first serve basis, and the bank cannot 
determine the type of agent withdrawing. Agents withdrawing in t1 can be impatient or only 
pretending to be patient agents.  This asymmetry of information can lead to the problem of bank 
runs. A bank in the Diamond Dybvig model will have a general idea of the relationship of patient 
to impatient agents and will determine the interest paid in t1 and t2 in such a way as to give 
patient agents an incentive to wait until t2. 
28
 
The bank can become endangered when a larger amount of agents than expected decides to 
withdraw early, as the bank pays interest on the t1 withdrawals before the investment project has 
generated actual returns. Such interest is financed via the return in period 2. Should too many 
agents withdraw early the t2 returns may not be sufficient.
29
  
Agents that derive utility from consuming in period two are aware of such a possibility and are 
able to withdraw at t1 and hold the money until t2 to consume. Thus patient agents may watch 
the bank and the number of early withdrawals in period 1 to determine their actions. There are 
two possible outcomes, both of which are equilibrium outcomes.
30
  
The first possibility is the positive equilibrium in which the patient agents have confidence in the 
bank and believe the bank will have enough funds to pay them when the investment project 
reaches maturity in t2.
31
  
The second possibility is the negative equilibrium, in which the patient agents notice a large 
number of agents withdrawing in t1, leading them to believe, that other patient agents are 
pretending to be impatient agents to withdraw in t1. This would lead the patient observer to 
worry that too many funds are being withdrawn and would lead him to run to the bank to 
withdraw his assets. This again increases the number of agents withdrawing in t1 and thus other 
patient agents have an incentive to run on the bank. In this case all patient agents have the 
                                                          
28
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.408 
29
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.409 
30
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.409 
31
 (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) p.409 
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incentive to run, thus leading to a run-equilibrium. The run on the bank becomes self fulfilling as 
patient agents only run on the bank because they suspect other agents of doing the same, thus 
resulting in the bank failing due to too many funds being withdrawn early.
32
  
To prevent such a negative equilibrium Diamond and Dybvig suggest deposit insurance. This 
will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.     
The Diamond Dybvig model is an influential model of bank runs and resulting financial crises, it 
does however have some flaws. While the model sees banking crises as being an inherent feature 
of banking, it makes some unrealistic assumptions about banking in general. First it assumes, 
that banks only serve one function, that of an intermediary issuing only one type of liability, one 
which can result either in debt or equity, depending on the period in which it is redeemed. 
Another weakness is the fact that the model relies on there being no outside capital. Banks are 
only able to invest that which was deposited by the agents in the model. The lack of bank capital 
exposes the banks to the possibility of a run. The model assumes a bank‟s assets to be less liquid 
than its liabilities.  
Additionally bank runs take place due to the sequential nature of the service by the banks in the 
Diamond Dybvig model. Other triggers for a bank run are not taken into account. The asset that 
the bank invests into is not assumed to be risky in any way, thus the threat of a run due to 
depositors fearing risky behavior on the side of the bank is nonexistent. The recent crisis 
however has shown that risk has a huge impact on bank runs and bank failures.  
The model does do a good job of demonstrating the basic risk sharing function of the bank in the 
sense that a bank can take over the liquidity risk, assuming that not all the depositors will 
withdraw at the same time due to the law of large numbers. The model also shows the basic 
effects of a bank run and its possible outcomes, as well as the fact that a run on an otherwise 
healthy bank can cause it to fail if enough patient depositors join in on the run on the bank.  
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During a panic, which arises when a large number of depositors lose trust in their banks 
simultaneously; that causes many such bank failures, a disruption of the monetary system is 
caused. The disruption of the monetary system in turn leads to a reduction in production, as 
banks reduce loans and financing dries up. To meet demand banks may call in its loans early 
which can cause the lender severe financial difficulties again hemming or disrupting production. 
In the case of non business borrowers it may lead to the borrowers having to sell their cars or 
homes to repay the loans thus causing even greater harm to the economy.   
A bank run can be triggered by a number of different situations and events. One can differentiate 
between information based and panic based bank runs. In panic based bank runs, the run is a 
psychological phenomenon where depositors lose trust in their banks and fear for their deposits. 
Such a fear can be triggered by anything ranging from bad bank fundamentals, to rumors over 
the fundamentals of a bank or even seeing an unusually long line in front of one‟s bank. A 
frightening aspect of panic based bank runs, is that even if the run is started by a rumor and the 
depositor knows it to be false, he still has an incentive to run on the bank if he fears that other 
depositors may withdraw.  
This problem has long been recognized, and as will be described later, for much of the post-war 
period, bank runs were regarded as belonging to the past. However, an increase in bank runs in 
the 1990‟s indicates that with changes in the regulatory environment, unanticipated risks can re-
emerge; making the phenomenon of bank runs a recurring one which justifies regular re-
appraisal.  
The effects of minimum capital requirements 
National as well as international law (Basel II) dictates a level of capital to assets required by a 
bank to operate. This protects the bank to a degree, but at the same time the same regulation 
reduces the maximum a bank can lend and thus reduces the level of money generated by the 
bank and also increases the bank‟s effective cost of capital.33  
By varying the capital requirements for banks, market liquidity can be affected. Higher capital 
requirements can reduce market liquidity, leading to a form of “credit crunch” as banks reduce 
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their lending. In theory, the higher level of capital would make the bank more resilient. An 
abrupt change in capital requirements can, however, produce the opposite result, as the loans a 
bank can offer may cause a run on the banks as “maturing deposits may exceed what the banks 
can pledge.”34  
The effects of deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance can be either explicit or implicit. Generally deposits up to a certain amount are 
explicitly covered by insurance (US$100.000 by the FDIC in the U.S., or up until recently 
E20.000 in Austria). Larger deposits may be implicitly covered in the event that the 
corresponding bank is too large for it to be allowed to fail.
35
  
Depending on how the deposits are insured, explicitly or implicitly, it has a different effect on 
banks and depositors. On the one hand, if all deposits are covered completely by deposit 
insurance and the time between the need for coverage and the coverage itself is relatively short, 
then the deposits have little to no “disciplinary effect”36 on the bank or its depositors. In short, 
the bank is protected and the deposits act as a type of capital the bank can draw on. When 
however, the deposits are not all entirely covered by insurance or are implicitly covered, then the 
banks may be prone to a limited run, which would have a disciplinary effect on the banks.
37
  
The reaction time of the insurer also plays a large role in the prevention of bank runs. If the 
insurer reacts immediately, then there is no incentive to run on the bank as business will continue 
as usual. Should the insurer however take his time there is a slight incentive to run on the insured 
bank as a need for short-term finance may force depositors to try and withdraw funds as they 
may not be able to wait for the insurer to act. Depending on the number of depositors in such a 
position, or depending on the preference structure of the depositors a bank run may or may not 
occur, depending on the liquidity level of the bank in question.  
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The perceived need for quick action on the part of state insurers has likely been a major 
influence on U.S. government response to the crash of 2008.  
 Intervention in a crisis 
One of the first actions seen in the financial crisis that started in 2007, was an infusion of cash 
into the market. Generally it is assumed that an infusion of capital into the banking sector or the 
industry would leave both sectors better off.
38
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that that is not 
the case. Through the infusion of capital into one of the sectors it increases said sector‟s 
bargaining power over the other.  
Were the banking industry to receive enough capital to prevent runs on banks, it could lead to the 
industrial sector being pressured even more by the banking sector. Were the infusion not to take 
place, “banks would have to sell off their loans to stave off a run”39 which would allow the 
industrial companies to renegotiate their loans with new creditors. Thus the infusion of capital 
would allow the banks to survive without the need to sell loans and in turn they would have to be 
tougher on their borrowers, leading to liquidations and mortgaging of futures by the industrial 
companies. Thus the infusion would worsen the situation for the industrial sector rather than 
improving their situation.
40
 
If, on the other hand, the industrial sector were to receive the infusion of capital, a number of 
companies would be able to repay their loans and avoid liquidation. Other companies would be 
capable of paying the banks more in the long run. Both of those results would not help the 
banking sector in the short run, as the banks would have gotten the money from the industrial 
companies that would have been liquidated due to insolvency, and the higher repayments in the 
long term do next to nothing to help the short term position of the banks. The assistance to the 
industrial sector could even lead to the industrial companies being able to reduce repayment by 
offering to renegotiate the repayment sum in return for immediate payment, which could damage 
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the banking sector in the long run.
41
 Overall the effects are similar to the investment in the 
banking sector. One sector (industry) is strengthened at the cost of the other, either in the long or 
in the short term.  
Though Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that the infusion of capital into markets can be 
detrimental, the infusion can however be beneficial if it is large enough to cover the entire 
market, and not only choice elements of it, restoring the balance of power between the different 
sectors.  
This shows us how bank capitalization influences a number of key aspects of banking. The 
higher the bank capitalization, the safer the banks are from bank runs. Additionally, the 
capitalization influences how willing the banks are to liquidate borrowers or the leverage they 
posses to extract repayment.
42
   
Demand Deposit Contracts – the root of all evil 
As explained in the segment about the role of banks in the economy, one of the primary roles of 
banks is to create liquidity out of illiquid assets. The most common method of doing so is by 
offering demand deposit contracts.  
Demand deposit is “a contract that requires an initial investment at T = 0 for the right to 
withdraw per unit of investment (at the discretion of the depositor and conditional on the bank‟s 
solvency) either x1 in period 1 and x2 in period 2 or y1 in period 1 and y2 in period 2.”
43
 The 
amount withdrawn varies in period 2 depending on the return on the investment the bank made. 
It may or may not be able to fully make its promised payments. This makes demand deposits 
more fitting for financing low-risk assets as the probability of lower returns due to failure 
decreases.  
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Demand deposit contracts allow depositors to join in on long term investments that are generally 
more profitable than short term investments, but at the same time allow the depositors to 
withdraw their deposits should they suffer early liquidity needs.
44
 This means that banks can 
offer a type of liquidity insurance to the depositors, as the banks deal with large amounts of 
customers with varying liquidity needs.  
On the down-side, demand deposit contracts make banks vulnerable to panic based bank runs. 
Such bank runs happen when depositors fear that all other depositors are going to rush to 
withdraw their funds from the bank causing it to fail and thus rush to withdraw their funds too. 
The wish to withdraw funds stems from the fact that depositors can be assumed to be, like most 
individuals, risk averse. Were depositors not risk averse, they would not be worried about the 
bank‟s ability to pay at maturity and thus panic based bank runs would be nonexistent.45  
Bank runs can happen when the fundamentals of a bank are extremely bad and thus the risk of 
default is extremely high. This leads to a change in the expected utility of waiting for the deposit 
to mature. The utility of withdrawing early becomes higher than the utility of waiting. Thus, even 
the patient depositors have an incentive to run on the bank. This massive increase in demand for 
liquidity forces the banks to sell off their long term assets at a loss to cover the withdrawals, thus 
damaging the bank.  
These effects of demand deposit contracts make demand deposits both valuable to the economy 
and an element that allows bank runs. With the effect bank runs can have on the banking 
industry, bank runs are “a major factor in [.] banking regulation all over the world.”46 
To explain demand deposits, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
47
 developed a model with two 
equilibria, one a positive one and one a negative one. The positive equilibrium is one in which 
only the impatient depositors withdraw their deposits early, receiving more from their deposits 
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than the liquidation value the long term asset would have. This is done at the expense of the 
patient investors, who gain less than the entire return of the long term asset when they withdraw. 
In this case, in the positive equilibrium, the demand deposits have a positive effect on welfare by 
improving risk sharing.
48
  
The negative equilibrium is the bank run. In the second equilibrium the investors collectively run 
on the bank, demanding their deposits and as a result the bank fails. This reduces overall welfare 
below that which could have been achieved without banks (the autarkic allocation).
49
 The failure 
is caused primarily due to the fact that the early liquidation of long term assets has lower payoffs 
than the returns on strictly short lived assets.
50
 At the same time, if the long term assets were 
sufficiently liquid then the short term liquidation wouldn‟t result in large losses, or if the 
depositors were not very risk averse, bank runs would not present a significant problem. 
The likelihood of the occurrence of the different equilibria depends on a number of factors, and 
is not easily discernible. As difficult as it may be to determine the likelihood of either of the 
situations occurring, it is an important determination. One result lowers overall welfare and the 
other increases it.  
To determine when banks increase overall welfare, one must look at why depositors run on 
banks in this model. Runs take place because depositors panic in response to bad expectations. 
Different theories exist on how the panic ensues; empirical precedents show that not all 
depositors have the same information, but are rather guided by noisy signals
51
 originating from 
other investors. Some may have special information allowing them to judge the banks‟ 
fundamentals. Others may misinterpret the fundamentals and panic. In both cases, the investors 
want to do what everyone else does. They run on the bank demanding their deposits for fear that 
all the other depositors will too.  In one case we speak of the information based bank run. This is 
the case when the bank run is triggered by „real‟ information regarding the fundamentals of the 
                                                          
48
 (Goldstein & Pauzner, 2005) p.1294 
49
 (Goldstein & Pauzner, 2005) p.1294 
50
 (Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988 ) p.570 
51
 (Goldstein & Pauzner, 2005) p.1294 
21 
 
bank. In the second case we have an irrational bank run triggered by a misinterpretation or false 
information. The information-based bank run primarily occurs following negative real shocks
52
, 
whereas the irrational bank run results from coordination failure in the sense that a bank run 
would not have taken place were it not for the actions of other depositors (running on the 
bank).
53
 
Some literature argues that bank runs may not always be triggered by real shocks. If one looks at 
banks as representing the banking system as a whole, and not just as individual banks, should 
signals be significantly negative, depositors may choose to reverse hedge. This means that risk 
adverse depositors may consume less in the short run, to invest more in the relatively uncertain 
future. This scenario is obviously only relevant if there are no alternative forms of investment. If 
the negative signals only referred to one bank, depositors would have an incentive to run on the 
bank and redeposit in another bank as was the case with Countrywide Financial in 2007. The 
same would be the case if the signals were directed at banks as a whole, in which case there 
would be other investment options such as government bonds. The depositors again would rush 
the banks and redeposit. This analysis is consistent with historical accounts of the Great 
Depression era and its system wide bank runs.
54
   
The incentive to run on banks is an interesting concept, as it does not increase monotonically as 
one would expect with the number of depositors running on the bank; the incentive to run on the 
bank is highest when the amount of depositors withdrawing their money reaches the point at 
which it forces the bank into bankruptcy.
55
 One does, however, have a monotonically increasing 
incentive to run as long as the number of depositors has not hit the critical point that causes 
bankruptcy. This special situation makes for an interesting, but difficult to calculate equilibrium.  
The equilibrium implies that the vulnerability of a bank to runs increases proportionately to the 
size of the short-term payments a bank offers.  If the short term payment equals the value that 
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can be attained by liquidating the long term asset, only efficient bank runs can occur. This has 
two implications: First, the damage done to banks by depositors running on the bank is greatly 
reduced. Second, bank runs would be caused by the value of the long term asset being low 
enough that it would be financially sound for the depositor to withdraw early.
56
 If the short term 
payments are above the long term asset liquidation value, bank runs will lead to inefficient bank 
runs, whereby the bank will be forced to liquidate assets that would result in high returns, were 
they liquidated come maturity.
57
 
These two realizations are important when trying to determine the optimal level of short term 
payments for banks. To gain the welfare bonus, one must increase the short term payments above 
the autarkic level to generate risk sharing.
58
 At the same time this bonus is offset by the cost 
created by the increased probability of bank runs and the associated costs of liquidating long 
term assets prematurely. 
In the first case, the increased cost due to an increased chance of bank runs, the cost varies 
depending on the difference between the short term payment offered by the bank and the 
liquidation value of the long term asset in the short term. The smaller the difference, the worse a 
bank‟s fundamentals must be to cause a bank run and the lower the damage that would be done 
to the bank in the case of a bank run.  
Preventing Bank runs 
To prevent bank runs from occurring, there are a number of different policies measures that can 
be implemented. The two most common policy measures found in literature discussing bank runs 
are the suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance.  
While both of these measures have been implemented, they are not without cost and the benefits 
of the measures need to be evaluated in relation to the costs they cause.  
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Suspension of convertibility 
Suspension of convertibility has been used successfully a number of times as in the case of 
“Corralito”, outlined in the section contemporary bank runs. It can prevent the premature 
liquidation of long term assets and thus reduce the damage caused to a bank in the case of a run. 
By suspending convertibility a bank gives itself time to secure more liquidity. This can be done 
by asking the central bank or competitors for loans or by liquidating less liquid assets. The time 
can also be taken to prepare for the coming storm on the branch offices by increasing the staff on 
duty to prevent lines or resupplying the branches with cash to be able to meet depositor demand. 
During this time steps can be made to try and regain depositor confidence through a number of 
media channels. This can in some cases help clear up depositor misunderstandings in the case of 
runs triggered by rumors or false information.  
While there are a number of things a bank can do on its own during the suspension of 
convertibility, sometimes the situation may have progressed so far, that the bank may not be able 
to sustain itself without external help. The time available during suspensions can be used to 
negotiate takeovers by competitors or the government to reduce the ultimate cost of the bank 
runs by limiting the amounts of illiquid assets that need to be liquidated to cover depositor 
demand.  
Suspension of convertibility does however have its own inherent cost. The suspension of 
conversion can prevent depositors who have early liquidity needs from being able to satisfy those 
needs by not being able to withdraw their deposits. It also can reduce confidence in the bank 
even further as the move to suspend convertibility implies that the bank is too weak to be able to 
sustain “business as usual”.  
The advantages and disadvantages of suspension of convertibility must be weighed when 
deciding on implementing this method of preventing or slowing a bank run and can be combined 
with other options under the correct circumstances.  
24 
 
Deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance is probably the most common policy used to prevent bank runs. Since the 
Great Depression there have been practically no bank runs in the U.S. thanks to deposit 
insurance. By pledging to cover deposits lost in the case of a bank failure, the risk that causes 
depositors to run on a bank to withdraw one‟s deposits early is greatly diminished. Deposit 
insurance does however only change the outcome and not prevent the panic.  
Similarly to the suspension of convertibility, deposit insurance has its own inherent drawbacks. 
Insurance creates the problem of moral hazard. Due to the way that insurance is set up, a single 
bank does not carry the full cost of a bank run on its establishment. This means that banks can 
offer above optimal short term payments, which not only increases the likelihood of bank runs 
(which is offset to a degree by the calming effect of deposit insurance), but also leads competing 
banks to increase their short term payments in order to remain competitive, raising the overall 
incentive to run on banks. The moral hazard also leads managers of banks to “take on more risk 
to maximize the option value of the deposit insurance”59, while at the same time the same moral 
hazard affects the depositors. Without the risk of losing one‟s deposits, the depositors have no 
incentive to monitor the banks.  
While moral hazard can be a negative side effect of deposit insurance, the concept of deposit 
insurance is a solid one. By setting higher capital requirements for banks one can counteract the 
moral hazard to a degree and restore the welfare aiding aspect of deposit insurance.  
The introduction of capital requirements helps reduce the moral hazard that banks face in the 
presence of deposit insurance. With capital requirements, banks need a percentage of their total 
liabilities in liquid assets to be allowed to go about its normal operations. This shifts the entire 
risk away from the insurer and leaves an element of the risk with the bank, as it is also gambling 
with its own assets and not purely the insurers. If the incentive to invest in risky assets is high, 
policy should ideally increase capital requirements to the point where the bank decides against 
investing in overly risky assets.  
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The savings and loan crisis (S&L) in the United States was a prime example of the negative 
effects deposit insurance can have on the behavior of depositors and banks. Deposit insurance 
allowed large amounts of bad debt (estimates at around US$130 billion)
60
 to be transferred from 
the savings and loans banks to taxpayers. The insurance did prevent runs; however it also 
encouraged the banks to take excessive risk. Much of the current literature on bank runs does not 
cover the moral hazard induced by the use of deposit insurance. Through the policy of deposit 
insurance, the interests of the banks and the depositors converge. The depositors want the bank 
to invest in higher risk assets to increase the returns and the banks can use foreign funds (the 
insurers) to gamble on the risky assets.
61
 The lack of monitoring created by such a policy needs 
to be factored into the benefits that deposit insurance brings by reducing bank run incentives.  
It can be hard to determine the correct level of capital requirement for banks. Recently risk-based 
premia have been implemented, with the challenge of achieving the correct timing. If one can 
pay the premium and then readjust the portfolio one can circumvent the policy. To prevent the 
circumventing of the risk-based premiums, there is a cost of monitoring involved and as such the 
results are again questionable.  
A further method to reduce the effects of moral hazard of deposit insurance would be to offer a 
limited deposit insurance which would then still create an incentive for depositors to monitor 
their bank. Such systems were used in a number of countries, but often don‟t do enough to 
prevent bank runs for example in the case of Northern Rock, where the government pledged to 
insure all deposits. Despite such a pledge the depositors continued to run on the bank, ultimately 
resulting in government intervention to save the ailing bank.  
One possible way to prevent bank runs is the introduction of newer, more complex contracts. 
This possibility was analyzed more recently by Green and Lin (2003)
62
 and Peck and Schell 
(2003)
63
. The authors conclude that flexible contracts that would allow banks to alter the 
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payment made to depositors could reduce the threat of bank runs. In the case of a flexible 
contract, the amount that the bank would pay depositors that wished to withdraw their deposits 
early would depend on the amount of deposits withdrawn prior to the last depositor.
64
 The papers 
do point out that such complex contracts are not implemented in the modern financial systems. 
The reasons for this may lie with the inherent risk of moral hazard such contracts result in, or in 
the high costs associated with such complex contracts and the monitoring that would be 
necessary. Banks would be able to lie about the number of depositors that withdrew early, thus 
reducing the amount they would have to pay. It is of note that the standard Austrian savings 
account is a three month account which is “normally” paid out on demand, but in the case of a 
run could be held until the end of the three month duration. 
One factor that, while not able to prevent bank runs, mitigates the negative effects of the run is 
the use of a large external agent to buy up the affected bank and pay off the liabilities. Such a 
scenario could be viable in the case that the long term return on the bank‟s assets is high and that 
the takeover would be profitable. This would be realistic in the case of a singular bank run on 
one institution and not an industry wide run. In most cases such an external agent would be a 
government; it could however also be a private agent of sufficient size.
65
  
Bank runs in politics (1830) 
While the government can use a number of precautions and measures to prevent or stop bank 
runs, bank runs can also have a strong impact on politics or be used as a weapon in politics.  
In the early 1830‟s, Great Britain was in a state of unrest with clamor for reform. The country 
party (Whigs) tried to pass a reform bill, which was rejected by the House of Lords. The 
rejection led to widespread rioting and threatened to drown the nation in chaos. As a desperate 
measure, the King of England invited the Duke of Wellington to form a government. To push 
through their bill the reform leaders threatened to instill a bank run to bring the country to a halt. 
This was to be done by having their supporters withdraw their funds from the banks under the 
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slogan: “To stop the Duke, go for Gold”.66 The threat of a run on the nations gold deposits and 
the resulting financial turmoil the nation would face caused the House of Lords to reconsider.  
The Lords backed down and the bill was passed. The threat of a run on the banks and civil unrest 
were enough to force the House of Lords into submission and show the possible consequences of 
bank runs on the political stability of nations.  
Bank runs of old 
This segment of the paper discusses banking panics that led to or were related to bank runs in the 
period prior to the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a government 
owned insurer for deposits. This period is interesting in the context of bank runs, as up until the 
establishment of the FDIC there was no large trustworthy insurer of deposits in the United States. 
This left the banking sector much more susceptible to bank runs as depositors had to fear for 
their deposits in the case that a bank failed.  
The Free Banking Period 
In the mid 1830‟s many American states adopted free banking which allowed banks to be opened 
without legislative or regulatory approval. During this time any group or individual could open a 
bank, also known as a free bank.
67
 The opening of such a bank required a minimum amount of 
capital and such free banks were required to deposit mortgages and government bonds with the 
local state banking authority. The banks then earned interest on their deposits.  
The free banks were allowed to hand out bank notes, which were traded on the market at varying 
prices. The state banking authority would periodically issue statements on the status of a bank 
and newspapers provided information on the value of bank notes and provided information 
regarding fake bank notes.
68
 Banks were obliged to redeem their notes at face value on demand 
and faced fines (were charged interest) by the local government banking authority if they did not 
redeem the notes in time.  
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The free banking period saw a number of years with a high number of banks closures. In 1854 
for example the banks in Indiana saw a particularly large number of banks close (34), which 
were attributed to a contraction of the banking system. This contraction created problems for the 
newer banks, which could not honor all of their obligations. This failure to honor their 
obligations triggered a run on all banks state-wide resulting in even the more stable, well-
established banks being discredited and often times failing.
69
 
These events also showed some of the critical aspects of bank runs for the first time. A large part 
of the runs was panic driven and based on incomplete or incorrect information which resulted in 
healthy banks being stormed. The exogenous events of banks not redeeming their notes led the 
note holders, with their incomplete information, to interpret the situation in such a way as to 
imply that other banks might also be in a similar situation. This started a contagion with note 
holders doubting their banks and opting to go with the safe action, withdrawals.  
The ensuing contagion gives banks, which have an information advantage over the note holders, 
the incentive to provide information to reduce the asymmetrical information between the banks 
and the customers. There are a number of methods banks can use to share information. They can 
for example use joint certification, or cover each other‟s liabilities to improve confidence.70  
In the case of the banking problems Indiana faced in 1854, representatives of a number of banks 
met to issue statements on the financial conditions of the banks and stockholders to restore 
confidence. The statements contributed to the relaxation of the situation and the situation calmed 
down in Indiana.  
The events of the free banking period show that at the time the bankers were aware of the effects 
of panic and contagion and tried their best to mitigate their effects. In the long run, evidence 
indicates that the bank runs only had a low impact on the number of banks that closed 
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permanently, thanks in part to the reactions of the bankers to jointly mitigate the effects of the 
runs.
71
  
Panic of 1884 
The panic of 1884 is a prime example of a large scale banking crisis in the era of the National 
Banking System. While it happened during the time of the Long Depression that lasted from the 
early 1870‟s to around 1893, focus on the panic of 1884 is helpful in discussing general bank 
runs. The panic appeared towards the end of the 1879-1885 business cycle and gave way to bank 
runs on a number of establishments.   
The panic began in New York, caused in part due to the failure of the brokerage firm Grant and 
Ward on May 8
th
 of 1884. The failure of the bank caused ripples in the financial sector, resulting 
in the closure of the Marine National Bank due to the fact that it had over certified a Grand and 
Ward check amounting to US$ 750,000. Within a week the next bank failed, the Second National 
Bank had become the victim of theft as the manager made off with three million US$.
72
  
Fueled by the bad news in the banking sector, depositors ran on the Metropolitan Bank forcing it 
to close the day after the Second National Bank closed. The ensuing panic caused a general drop 
in stock prices, as loans were called in and banks tried to raise funds. Fels (1952) recounts that 
the interest rates at the time peaked at “four percent for twenty-four hours”. Banks were calling 
in loans and many banks were failing or closing.
73
 
The Bank failures did not only happen at a time of business depression, which led to the banking 
panic. The panic was fueled by the government‟s silver policy, which led to fears that the gold 
standard could not be maintained, further weakening confidence in the system, thus fueling the 
runs and the ensuing panic. 
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While the panic was widespread and forced a lot of banks into submission it was not a lengthy 
panic, as steps were rapidly taken to restore confidence in the system. “The defalcation of the 
Second National was made good, and both it and the Metropolitan reopened at once.”74 By mid 
1885 the economy was recovering and began a weak revival.
75
   
Panic of 1907 
The economic backdrop of 1907 was one of instability. At the time, the U.S. did not have a 
central bank and money supply fluctuated according to industrial and agricultural cycles. Rising 
interest rates abroad led to less capital being invested in the U.S. reducing expected money 
supply.
76
  
The Panic of 1907 had its roots in an elaborate scheme to earn money by manipulating the stock 
market. The goal was to acquire a large enough amount of stock in the United Copper Company, 
belonging to Augustus Heinze, to be able to manipulate the price of the stock.
77
 Together with 
his brother and an associate, the banker Charles Morse, Heinze wanted to buy up United Copper 
Company shares from short sellers, and then buy up outstanding stock to be able to sell the 
shares back to the short sellers at a significant markup, in effect squeezing the short sellers for 
money. To do this they needed a significant amount of capital and the Knickerbocker Trust 
Company was consulted, as the president of the trust had helped finance Morse a number of 
times. Knickerbocker however was not willing to finance the scheme and the Heinzes attempted 
the scheme without further support.
78
 The scheme failed on October 17
th
, resulting in the 
collapse of the United Copper Company and the ruination of the Heinze family. The companies 
tied to the family went bankrupt, including the brokerage house Gross and Kleeberg and the 
State Savings Bank of Butte Montana.  
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At the time, Heinze and Morse were serving on a number of national and state banks as well as 
on trust companies and insurance firms.
79
 When news of their financial ruin hit the streets, 
panicked depositors began a run on any related establishment. The runs became systemic when 
the Knickerbocker Trust Company suffered a run due to its association with Morse and Heinze. 
On October 22
nd
, 1907, over US$ 8 million were withdrawn from Knickerbocker in the course of 
a few hours and it was forced to suspend operations.
80
 
The panic then spread to other trusts and banks and within a few days a number of banks had 
failed due to runs.
81
 To stop the systemic panic a number of prominent figures, including J.P. 
Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, coordinated a number of meetings to help recapitalize the 
market and end the panic.
82
 Over US$ 40 million were pumped into the banks and trusts on the 
24
th
 of October 1907.
83
 
The capital infusion helped the banks survive the following days, but at the same time the stock 
markets were suffering from a lack of funds, due to the reluctance of the banks to lend money. 
Again, large funds were necessary to keep the stock market going.   
With funds running low, new approaches were taken to restore confidence in the banking system. 
Committees were formed to explain the situation to newspapers and clergy to have them help 
calm the populace. The communication resulted in calm being restored in New York City by the 
2
nd
 of November 1907.
84
 The 1907 panic was just one of many economic problems faced during 
the period of economic contraction lasting from early 1907 to mid 1908, as Figure 4 shows, with 
the lowest point being recorded on November 15
th
 1907.  
During the panic, new methods were used to try and restore consumer confidence. At the same 
time the U.S. came to the realization that the lack of a central bank resulted in a lack of money 
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supply during periods of low cash reserves. This led to the eventual creation of the Federal 
Reserve System which was supposed to help prevent future panics by creating an additional 
source of capital for financial institutions.  
Figure 4 Dow Jones Industrial Average 1907-1909
85
 
 
The Great Depression 
Due to an improvement in economic conditions towards the end of the 19
th
 Century and through 
to 1921, the number of banks in the United States increased rapidly. This increase was aided in 
no small part by the statutory changes in the capital requirements needed to form a new bank. 
The Currency Act of 1900 halved the necessary capital required to start a national bank from 
$50,000 to $25,000
86
 which, according to Mengle (1990), led to approximately two-thirds of all 
new banks being small, often times just barely having the required minimum capital of $25,000. 
An additional reason why the number of banks increased was that many rural communities 
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required loans to cover ever increasing costs (commodity prices, real estate), while at the same 
time strong economic growth increased the attractiveness of rural banking.
87
  
Beginning with the early 1920s, agricultural problems such as crop failures and falling farm real 
estate values, led to an increased amount of bank failures, largely in rural areas. The banks that 
had been created to service rural communities were hit by the difficulties faced by the farmers 
who had taken out loans with the banks. These initial closures launched a period of massive bank 
failures, beginning with 505closures in 1921
88
, followed by 500 and 1000 bank failures per year 
until the 1930‟s, when bank failures shot into the thousands.89 In that decade, nearly half of all 
small banks in agricultural regions had failed. 
The situation for small banks was further compounded when the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the agency responsible for regulating national banks, discarded the branching restrictions,
90
 as up 
until that point, many states prohibited branching or restricted it to geographic areas, thus 
preventing banks from diversifying their lending. 
 This led to a large increase in the number of bank branches (from 1,400 in 1921 to 3,500 in 
1930).
91
 The competitive advantages that branches had over smaller banks undoubtedly led to an 
increase in competition and a reduction in profits for the smaller banks, weakening their already-
strained fundamentals.  
The stage was set for large scale bank runs in the beginning of the 1930s. With the onset of the 
Great Depression, the number of failed banks exploded. In the first three years of the 1930s the 
average number of annual bank failures was around 1,700. In 1933 the number of bank failures 
exceeded 4,000.
92
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In 1930 the Bank of the United States suffered a run which was blamed by many for having 
started the collapse of banking during the Great Depression.
93
 According to the New York Times, 
the run was due to a false rumor that originated from a holder of stock who claimed that the 
Bank of the United States was unwilling to sell his stock. This rumor led to a large crowd of 
customers besieging the bank branch in the Bronx in New York, wanting to withdraw their 
money. Over the course of one day, customers had withdrawn $2 million from the branch in New 
York. The news of the run spread, leading to smaller runs in the area.  Fearing a further run, the 
directors had the bank closed to business, which led to a massive drop of their stock price, as 
well as to the stock price of other banks. The reputation of the bank was further tarnished by the 
opening of legal inquiries and legal action. The early closing during business hours and the legal 
proceedings led to the closing of the Bank of the United States, which was a shock to the 
banking industry. Americans hurried to withdraw their deposits from other banks, leading the 
affected banks to sell assets and call in outstanding loans in order to maintain liquidity. In 
December 1930 alone, over 300 banks had failed.  
The establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
While bank runs are generally acknowledged to be a strong reason for the large amount of bank 
failures during the Great Depression, some argue against bank runs being the main reason for 
bank failures, believing other factors to have been the more dominant reasons. However the 
effects of the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, support the theory that the 
bank runs were responsible for the bank failures, as the bank failures, for the most part, came to a 
halt with its creation in 1933. This leads one to believe that the reduction in uncertainty due to 
the insurance was responsible for reducing the threat of bank runs.   
With the establishment of the FDIC in 1933, the backdrop of the banking sector changed. The 
FDIC was created in response to the numerous bank failures occurring at the beginning of the 
20
th
 Century, to “preserve and promote public confidence in the U.S. financial system by 
insuring deposits in banks and thrift institutions.”94 The FDIC prides itself on its 
accomplishments in reducing the threat of bank runs, stating that “since the introduction of the 
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FDIC on January 1
st
, 1934 no depositor has lost a single cent of insured funds as a result of 
failure.”95  
More recently events that can be likened to bank runs have become more prevalent and will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Contemporary Bank Runs 
MBf Finance Berhad (1999) 
On September 25
th
 1997, rumors about the health of the chairman of MBF Finance in Malaysia, 
prompted depositors of MBF Finance to run on the bank.
96
 The bank was Malaysia‟s largest 
finance company and the collapse of said institution would have plunged Malaysia‟s banking 
sector into chaos. The Malaysian national bank, Bank Negra, pledged support for the ailing bank 
assuring the depositors that “there is no cause for alarm.”97 Despite the assurances of the national 
bank, the run on 120 branches of MBF Finance saw deposits totaling around US$4.49 billion 
being withdrawn, forcing the national bank to take control of the stricken bank.
98
 
 
While bank runs were virtually non-existent in OECD countries after the Great Depression, 
other, less developed countries, still saw a number of bank runs. The case of MBf Finance 
Berhad shows that even a national bank may not be sufficient to stave off a bank run if the 
environment is too uncertain and the trust in the national bank is not sufficient.  
Corralito (2001) 
From January 2001 to November 2001, the Argentinean banking system suffered a loss of 
reserves and deposits triggered by a currency run, which led to a general bank run. The reserve 
losses totaled US$ 10.9 billion over the following eleven month period, with losses in deposits 
totaling around US$ 11.5 billion. 
99
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This bank run is remarkable for the fact that Argentina had deposit insurance in place at the time, 
which did little to prevent the bank run.  A number of factors contributed to the bank run. 
Argentina faced liquidity problems as it had accrued a large amount of short-term debt which 
had to be repaid.
100
 The financial system used relied on the dollar lending, while borrowers relied 
on peso-denominated cash flows, resulting in a currency mismatch. This discrepancy fueled by a 
fear of a nominal devaluation led depositors to withdraw their money and exchange it for 
dollars
101
, leading to a currency run and thus to a general bank run. As a result, the banking crisis 
was, to an extent, expected, and larger, better informed depositors had enough time to withdraw 
their money. The bank run hit its highest point on the 30
th
 of November with deposits falling by 
US$1.4 billion and reserves falling by US$1.7 billion (see Figure 5 Evolution of Deposits and 
Reserves in Argentina). 
 
The following figure shows the development of the banking crisis in Argentina, showing the 
deposits and reserves as well as significant events such as an IMF Loan and the devaluation of 
the peso and its effect on the banking system.  
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Figure 5 Evolution of Deposits and Reserves in Argentina
102
 
 
The Argentine bank run led to a suspension of convertibility of bank deposits on December 3
rd
 of 
2001. This suspension was termed the “corralito” (“little fence”), as deposits were still 
transferrable within the national financial system, but deposits were not allowed to leave the 
system or be redeemed in cash.
103
 The “corralito” managed to slow the decline in deposits and 
reserves and with the additional measures implemented on the 7
th
 of January 2002 (the 
devaluation of the peso) and the 3
rd
 of February (the “pesification” of bank deposits), order was 
restored to the national banking system,
104
 although at significant cost to consumers, whose 
savings had been significantly reduced in value.  
 
BAWAG (2006) 
The BAWAG (Bank for Employment and Commerce) was an Austrian bank owned by the ÖGB 
(Austrian Trades Union Federation), founded in 1922 by the Socialist Chancellor Karl Renner. 
The bank‟s original mission was to provide inexpensive credit to those in need. More recently, 
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BAWAG was known for being a modern bank which was involved in private investment in the 
Public Equity sector via REFCO.  
In October of 2005 REFCO filed for bankruptcy and in doing so, exposed massive loans made 
by the BAWAG to REFCO (US$410 million), on a Sunday, hours before REFCO went bankrupt 
on Monday. These loans were made in return for REFCO shares that became valueless with the 
bankruptcy. Only a few months later, in March of 2006, news of massive losses made in 
Caribbean business deals was also made public and consumer trust melted away, with depositors 
fearing for the solvency of the bank.  
On April 28
th
 2006, depositors started pulling their deposits from the BAWAG, starting a run on 
the bank. To help restore order, the leader of the ÖGB, Rufolf Hundstorfer, signed an unlimited 
guarantee for the BAWAG on the first of May. The following day, further guarantees were made 
by the government (900 million Euros), and competitors (450 million Euros in deposits to ensure 
liquidity) to help restore confidence in the solvency of the BAWAG. As a symbolic gesture, 
prominent political figures opened accounts with the bank to show their confidence in the future 
of the bank. While this did not stem the tide of depositors attempting to withdraw their deposits, 
it did send a signal that the government was going to support the bank.
105
  
Over the next few weeks the government pledged more support to the BAWAG and additional 
competitors invested in the BAWAG to help restore liquidity. The actions taken by the 
government and the banking sector ended the small bank run on the BAWAG and prevented any 
larger banking panic. The crisis ended with the BAWAG being sold to US-based Cerberus 
Capital Management for the price of €3.2 billion, with the Austrian Trade Union Federation, the 
former sole owner of BAWAG, just managing to remain solvent. 
The BAWAG bank run shows that bank runs need not always be systemic but can be limited to 
one bank if the financial environment is sound and the events triggering the run do not involve 
other banks in the industry.  
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Northern Rock (2007) 
Northern Rock was one of the five largest mortgage lenders in the United Kingdom. The bank 
followed the business model of not relying solely on deposits, but rather borrowing money from 
financial institutions and banks at market rates to allow it to offer competitive loans to 
customers. This reliance on money markets is what ultimately led to a liquidity shortage, as the 
U.S. mortgage crisis led to a slow down of lending. This slowdown caused the London interbank 
offering rate (LIBOR) to surge, further reducing lending. Thus Northern Rock‟s liquidity became 
jeopardized by the sub-prime real estate crisis.  
To determine the beginning of the credit crisis one can analyze the outstanding amounts of 
ABCPs (asset backed commercial papers, which were used to fund “holdings of long-dated 
mortgage-related assets.”)106 The ABCPs can be used to determine the demand for “short-term 
lending against mortgage assets.”107 Using the data from the Federal Reserve one can see a sharp 
decline early August.  
Figure 6 Asset-backed Commercial Paper Outstanding
108
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As a consequence of the U.S. mortgage crisis, on September 14
th
 2007
109
, even though the bank 
was still solvent, having only half the number of delinquent mortgages on its books than other 
banks, Northern Rock applied for financial support from the Bank of England to bolster its 
liquidity. This is of particular importance, as it implies that Northern Rock had liquidity 
problems prior to and not due to a bank run, making the bank run different than the classical 
bank run. Northern Rock became a victim of a bank run with creditors freezing funds in contrast 
to the traditional depositor run.  
When news of the financial assistance became public many customers became worried about the 
stability of the bank and began large scale withdrawals, starting a run on the bank, which was the 
first bank-run in the United Kingdoms since 1866.
110
 The image presented by the numerous 
customers queuing up in front of Northern Rock branches only contributed to the feeling of 
unease that was present in Northern Rock depositors fueling the run. 
No amount of deposit insurance was enough to deter the bank run, even though the Bank of 
England agreed to an unlimited loan to Northern Rock to help restore liquidity. With public 
symbols such as the loans to the bank not restoring customer confidence, the future of Northern 
Rock looked grim. After two unsuccessful attempts to sell the bank, Northern Rock, it was 
nationalized on February 22
nd
 2008, becoming one of the most high-profile victims of the 2007 
credit crisis. The rescue of Northern Rock was not undertaken to rescue the bank per se, but 
rather to prevent any further damage to the economy that could result from the loss of confidence 
in the banking sector.  
As a result of the nationalization, customers regained confidence in Northern Rock, with a large 
amount of new deposits in the bank. This may have been due to the notion that the bank, being 
nationalized, could not fail, and thus was a safe place to keep one‟s money.111  
The following figure shows the composition of liabilities of Northern Rock in millions of pounds 
and shows that securitized notes and covered bonds remained constant prior to and after the run 
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on the bank, showing Northern Rock‟s weakness having been in the wholesale and retail 
liabilities.  
Figure 7 Aftermath of Run: Composition of Liabilities (million pounds)
112
 
 
 
The run on Northern Rock showed a number of different things. It was similar to old fashioned 
bank runs in that the customers lining up in front of the different branches trying to withdraw 
their deposits. At the same time, however, there was a second type of run on the bank, an online 
run where depositors attempted to withdraw their money via the online interface of the bank. The 
resulting traffic was too much for the bank‟s servers to handle and led to a number of customers 
not being able to access the site at all, fueling the fears over the state of the bank.  
 
The example of Northern Rock is an opportunity to apply the economic theory of bank runs to a 
real life example. Northern Rock showed the “futility of public statements of reassurance, the 
mutually-reinforcing anxiety of depositors, as well as the power of the media in galvanizing and 
channeling that anxiety through the power of television images.”113 At the same time subtle 
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differences to conventional bank run theory become apparent. In the case of Northern Rock it 
was not the depositors who brought about the liquidity crises, but rather the short- to medium 
term creditors who retreated from the market. 
 
Shin (2008) argues that that one should look to the classic coordination failure method as 
described by Bryant (1980)
114
 and Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
115
, to describe the situation. The 
theory expects an individual depositor to run on the bank, fearing other depositors will do the 
same, leaving nothing left for the depositors who don‟t run.  
 
While the liquidity problems arose before the depositor run, one can see a creditor run in Figure 
6. This run however did not only target Northern Rock or the banking industry in the United 
Kingdom, but rather the entire market. Thus, according to Shin (2008), “if there was a run driven 
by a coordination failure, then it was a run [on] all the institutions that relied on short-term 
funding of this type, rather than [a run on] Northern Rock in particular.”116 
 
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the difference between the creditors involved in the 
run and the depositors of the coordination failure model of bank runs. In the model, creditors are 
depositors that decide rationally whether to run or not, depending on their beliefs of what other 
depositors will do, unconstrained by other considerations.
117
 In the case of the creditors involved 
in the run on Northern Rock and the market as a whole, there were “sophisticated investors”, or 
creditors that face constraints on their decisions defined by market developments. As such, the 
run on Northern Rock could be seen as a “tightening of constraints on the creditors of Northern 
Rock, rather than as a coordination failure”118 as defined by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The 
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conclusion we can draw from the run on Northern Rock is, that “modern banking cannot be 
viewed separately from capital market developments.”119 
 
Countrywide Financial Corporation (2007) 
In spite of the existence of the FDIC, which guarantees up to US$100,000 per bank account and 
US$ 250,000 per retirement account, the Countrywide Financial bank run demonstrates that bank 
runs can occur in systems with deposit insurance. The British government on the other hand only 
fully guaranteed deposits up to US$4,000 and 90% of deposits up to US$ 70,000 but nothing 
beyond that limit. Additionally one can expect even US accounts over such limits to be protected 
as the FDIC has enough measures in place to keep larger banks solvent. Additionally, Ben 
Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve stated his willingness to rescue the banking 
system, whereas Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England had, originally, been less 
supportive in the case of Northern Rock.  
Despite FDIC protection, Countrywide Financial Corporation, the largest home loan company in 
the Unites States, suffered an old fashioned bank run on August 17
th
 of 2007. The run was 
triggered by fears that Countrywide Financial Corporation might file for bankruptcy protection 
due to a worsening credit crunch resulting from the sub-prime mortgage crisis. The firm had 
borrowed US$11.5 billion, using up its credit line to help meet funding needs and to encourage 
growth. The announcement resulted in the stocks of Countrywide Financial taking a hit (11%) 
and sent depositors running to withdraw their funds. The situation was compounded by a 
breakdown of the bank‟s website and toll free service number which fueled fears about the 
bank.
120
   
Some depositors admitted to being “spooked”, and were motivated by the desire to “be on the 
safe side.” Others argued that it could take time until the FDIC would cover the deposits and 
were worried about short term liquidity. Many customers withdrew their deposits to re-deposit 
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them with rival banks such as Bank of America, showing that the run was isolated to a single 
institution and was triggered by bad fundamentals of the target bank.  
The run on Countrywide Financial ultimately resulted in its sale to Bank of America for US$ 4 
billion and one of the first bank runs in the U.S. since the Great Depression. The run showed 
some of the psychology behind bank runs and the different factors that arose that were not taken 
into account when planning for possible bank runs, such as the depositor‟s need for short term 
liquidity and the effects prior incidents may have on depositor psychology, such as the mistrust 
caused by the S&L crisis in the U.S.   
IndyMac Bank (2008) 
The Indy Mortgage Company (IndyMac) was a combined savings and loans association and 
mortgage bank in the U.S. It provided lending for the development, purchase and improvements 
of single-family housing, as well as secondary mortgages. 
Prior to its collapse on July 11
th
 2008, “the bank relied heavily on higher cost, less stable, 
brokered deposits, as well as secured borrowings, to fund its operations and focused on stated 
income and other aggressively underwritten loans in areas with rapidly escalating home 
prices”.121 The failure was widely expected and in the last quarterly report before its collapse, 
made on May 12
th
 2008, IndyMac reported its third consecutive quarterly loss with massive 
increases in nonperforming loans.  Additionally IndyMac was close to falling from the capital 
position of “well capitalized”, to “adequately capitalized”. For IndyMac such a classification 
would have meant that it would have to reduce its assets and curtail its lending activity.
122
  
IndyMac was a victim of the economic crisis and its risky business strategy. Most of all however, 
it fell victim to a bank run. The impetus of the bank run was a member of the Senate Banking 
Committee, the chairman of Congress‟ Joint Economic Committee and the third-ranking 
Democrat in Senate, Charles Schumer. On the 26
th
 of June, 2008, Charles Schumer released a 
number of letters warning of “The possible collapse of big mortgage lender IndyMac Bancorp 
                                                          
121
 (FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Letter of Intent to Sell IndyMac Federa, 2009) 
122
 (SEC, 2008) 
45 
 
Inc.”123 and that it “poses significant financial risks to its borrowers and depositors and 
regulators may not be ready to intervene to protect them”.124   
These comments should be seen in the context of growing unease about sub-prime mortgage 
lender, which caused politicians to seek public attention in an election year.  
These statements triggered a bank run with depositors, fearing for their money, scrambling to 
withdraw their capital from IndyMac. The open letters were quickly publicly criticized for 
destabilizing the bank. During the eleven days following the open letters, depositors of IndyMac 
withdrew close to $1.4 billion (7.4%) of the reported $18.9 billion in deposits. Due to the 
massive run on deposits, the main branch was shut three hours early on the 11
th
 of July by 
regulators only to be reopened again the following Monday.  
On July 8
th, the impact of the loss of trust in IndyMac let the bank‟s shares close at $0.44 on the 
New York Stock Exchange, equating to a loss of over 99% from its 2006 high of $50.
125
 Only 
three days later, on July 11
th
, the IndyMac Bank was placed into conservatorship by the FDIC. 
To administer the deposits and liabilities of IndyMac, IndyMac Federal Bank was established. 
The bank was then to be reopened the following Monday.  
Even though the FDIC guaranteed the funds of all insured accounts up to $100,000, an estimated 
10,000 uninsured depositors lost over $270 million.
126
 With over $32 billion in assets, IndyMac 
Bank was the third largest bank failure in American history. On August 1
st
, 2008 IndyMac 
Bancorp filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
127
  
The failure of IndyMac taxed the FDIC. The cost to the FDIC has not yet been fully determined, 
with primary estimates stating between $4 billion and $8 billion.
128
 More recent estimates placed 
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the cost closer to $8.9 billion.
129
 The run on IndyMac was another prime example of how an 
uncertain environment can turn any negative statement into a reason to distrust a bank and 
initiate a run. Even deposit insurance was insufficient to stave off the run on IndyMac.  
Washington Mutual (2008) 
Washington Mutual, the largest savings and loans bank in the Unites States was one of the 
strongest performers of Wall Street, earning large profits as it took over banks on the east- as 
well as the west-coast, while at the same time increasing mortgage lending.  Washington 
Mutual‟s success built on the strategy of focusing on lower- to middle-class consumers deemed 
too risky by competitors. Offering complex mortgages and credit cards with terms allowing even 
the least creditworthy customers to get financing, Washington Mutual expanded into large cities 
such as Los Angeles, New York and Chicago.
130
  
The success achieved by Washington Mutual came to a grinding halt with the bursting of the 
housing bubble. Losses began to increase due to the mortgage loans and the interest-only and 
pay-option amortization products that had attracted the low-grade borrowers. These losses were 
compounded by the credit card loan portfolio as larger mortgage payments and higher food and 
gas bills caused losses to increase. All of this did not go unnoticed on Wall Street, which led to a 
steadily declining share price. To stave off the impending collapse, Washington Mutual turned to 
banks and private equity firms such as Carlyle Group and the Blackstone Group in search of 
aid.
131
  
In March of 2008, JPMorgan Chase replied, offering Washington Mutual $8 per share, primarily 
in stock. However the offer was rejected by Washington Mutual. A month later, Texas Pacific 
Group, a private equity firm in cooperation with institutional investors gave Washington Mutual 
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an infusion of capital amounting to seven billion U.S. dollars which helped keep the company 
going for a few more months.
132
  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 16
th
 of September led to a panic in the financial markets 
and led to a surge in withdrawals by Washington Mutual customers. To prevent an all out run 
and the burden such a run would have on the FDIC the government “stepped up its efforts, at 
points going behind [Washington Mutual‟s] back to work privately with four potential bidders on a 
deal.”133 
Analysts predicted a cost of up to $30 billion to the FDIC should Washington Mutual fail, which 
would have been a huge burden to the already cash strapped FDIC which had been severely 
burdened by the collapse of the IndyMac bank. At the same time potential buyers were worried 
those same losses could make it hard to absorb Washington Mutual. Additionally, the fact that a 
$700 billion emergency bailout package for the financial sector was being discussed by congress, 
led many potential buyers to wait with their decisions pending the results of the congressional 
debate.
134
  
On September 25
th
, 2008 Washington Mutual,  the “giant lender that came to symbolize the 
excesses of the mortgage boom, was seized by federal regulators […], in what is by far the 
largest bank failure in American history.”135 Washington Mutual agreed to sell branches and 
assets to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion, as part of a government-brokered rescue deal, ending 
Washington Mutual‟s 119-year life as an independent company and averting a huge burden for 
the U.S. taxpayers.
136
 JPMorgan Chase took on at least $31 billion in losses that could have 
fallen to the FDIC had the takeover not taken place.  
“Washington Mutual, with $307 billion in assets, is by far the biggest bank failure in history, 
eclipsing the 1984 failure of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust in Chicago, an event 
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that presaged the savings and loan crisis. IndyMac, which was seized by regulators in July, was 
one-tenth the size of [Washington Mutual].”137 
The failure of Washington Mutual left customers largely unaffected. Shareholders and some 
bondholders however were wiped out. To prevent a further threat of a bank run, Washington 
Mutual account holders‟ deposits were guaranteed by the FDIC up to $100,000 and were 
additionally backed by JPMorgan Chase.  
Washington Mutual fell victim to a general panic caused by the collapse of another bank 
(Lehman Brothers) and showed that bad fundamentals don‟t always result in bank runs, but 
rather can act as a signal in the case of broader panic as to what bank might be unstable, which in 
turn may trigger bank runs, showing how panic can spread throughout the industry.  
Crisis of 2007-2009 
The collapse of the U.S. real estate market in 2006 and the bursting of the housing bubble in 
2007 were the initiators of the great financial crisis that was to follow in the years 2008-2009. 
The crash of summer 2008 has been one of the most important events of our lifetimes, being the 
largest crash since the Great Depression, with the market recently having fallen farther and more 
rapidly than it did at the time of the Great Crash of 1929-1932, as can be seen in Figure 8. The 
crash of 2008 is also of particular significance as it is during times of economic uncertainty that 
most bank runs take place.  
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Figure 8 Four Bad Bear Markets
138
 
 
The year 2008 was a year of extreme uncertainty as it began with the scandal of Société 
Générale, a French financial services company, in which a junior trader engaged in unauthorized 
trading in sums (49.9 billion Euros) in excess of the bank‟s total market capitalization that 
resulted in spectacular losses, totaling approximately 4.9 billion Euros. The losses caused by 
unauthorized trading sowed doubt about the safety measures in place to prevent such actions and 
showed a weakness in the modern financial system that was a beneficiary of the most 
sophisticated technological advances, with Société Générale having been the recipient of an 
award for best system of risk management.  
The bursting of the sub-prime mortgage bubble and the resulting losses accrued by banks and 
companies heavily involved in sub-prime mortgages further increased uncertainty as 
shareholders waited for resulting markdowns. It was the impact of the elimination of the Glass-
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Steagall act, which allowed brokerages to become banks, as was the case with J.P. Morgan and 
Merrill Lynch. With the result, that anxiety about bank holdings of subprime mortgages, and 
fears of declining profitability in stock market created mutually negative reinforcing effects in 
the financial sector.  
2008 was also an election year in the world‟s largest economy, the U.S., which increased general 
uncertainty. The resulting democratic campaigns painted a dire picture of the U.S. economy with 
the goal of discrediting the republican president, leading to further anxiety over the economy.  
This uncertainty and the economic crisis reintroduced bank runs to the nations of the OECD with 
a number of high profile victims. While there has been much debate on the origins of the crisis, 
there has been little consensus on the matter. One argument was that the extremely low Federal 
funds rate of only 1% may have accounted for the financial crash, as it helped create an 
unsustainable economic boom.
139
 The low Federal Funds Rate may have been implemented due 
to the dot-com crisis, as a means to prevent a large economic crisis. If that were the case 
however, the current crisis would be a direct result of the dot-com crisis, implying that the crisis 
was not averted, but rather postponed and amplified.  
The crisis of 2007-2009 is also of note, due to the fact that the stock market crash was 
reminiscent of the traditional bank runs, in the sense that mass psychology, triggered by an 
uncertain economic environment, led to a run on the stock markets with investors attempting to 
move their funds from the stock markets to other, „safer‟, investment opportunities, creating 
something akin to a “stock run”. The similarities open up the possibility of looking at bank runs 
to help policy makers decide when to step in and to what extent when trying to prevent stock 
market crashes.  
While the 2007-2009 financial crisis has shown shortcomings of the modern financial regulatory 
system, as with theory on preventing bank runs, the new financial system that could be put in 
place in 2010 might fix the problems of 2008, but will not rule out the inevitable disruptions to 
the system in the future.  
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Conclusion 
Back in the bad old days, negative expectations on the future of a bank led to what economists 
term: “bank runs”, that would see a large number of depositors run to the bank, demanding to 
withdraw their money, resulting in huge losses, and often times the bankruptcy of the affected 
bank.  
Due to the introduction of the FDIC, such events should be a thing of the past, as the depositors 
are no longer in any risk of losing their deposits. Depositors can, however, still incur losses due 
to later payments by the FDIC. Recent events have however shown that bank runs are still 
possible and the consumer confidence can still be shaken. This is due to the banking industry 
being an industry that is built on credibility, trust and confidence. With a crisis large enough to 
dispute credibility, end trust and erode confidence the possibility of bank runs again becomes a 
real and possible danger to modern banks.  
Early examples of bank runs suggest that bank runs start due to panics, incomplete or incorrect 
information. Modern communication media both help combat the problem by being able to 
spread information quickly to the masses, and compound the problem by allowing for more 
incomplete and incorrect information to be spread and thus the modern financial systems must 
still grapple with the roots of panic based bank runs, which can still cause ripples in other 
industries by the nature of the role banks posses in modern economies.  
Modern forms of banking, such as online banking have opened up banks to a new form of bank 
run, that takes place silently via the web pages of a bank and can lead to new forms of panic due 
to bandwidth problems when too many customers log on to the web site simultaneously causing 
the site to become inaccessible. While many banks are aware of the danger, Northern Rock 
experienced such a “silent run” on its bank shortly before it failed.  
As the bank runs on Washington Mutual and Countrywide Financial showed even deposit 
insurers as large as the FDIC are not always capable of preventing bank runs if the depositors 
feel they have sufficient reason to fear the failure of a bank and thus other methods of preventing 
bank runs need to be devised.  
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This begs the question, are banking failures a byproduct of a sophisticated financial system? This 
does not necessarily need to be the case. Lax financial regulation and oversight however have let 
confidence in the industry slide and a number of large scandals have shown that the current 
system does have serious weaknesses. To overcome the problems the current financial system 
faces it would be prudent to analyze the similarities between the current crisis and the underlying 
mass psychology and compare it to the mass psychology involved in bank runs of old. The 
example of Northern Rock has shown that depositors and investors see a degree of safety in state 
takeovers of troubled institutions. Tougher regulation would most certainly be a step in the 
direction of restoring confidence in the financial system, but at what cost?  
Bank runs are a recurring problem for banks due to fractional reserve banking and the flexibility 
involved in demand deposits. The current crisis came about due to the ever increasing 
competition of banks, leading to more and more complex derivatives and more risky loans and 
investments to increase returns. Tougher regulation would not only boost confidence, but also 
lessen the growth of the banking industry and as a result general growth.  
How policy takes the current crisis and the reemergence of bank runs into account has yet to be 
seen and one can only hope that the lessons of past crisis, their roots and the solutions will be 
taken into consideration when making future decisions.  
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Appendix 
Abstrakt 
Das beispiellos Turbulente Jahr 2008 hat die Effizienz der Bankenaufsicht  und die Aufsicht über 
andere Finanzinstitute in Frage gestellt. Obwohl die Krise neue Probleme mit sich brachte, sind 
die Interdependenzen zwischen Psychologie und Veränderungen von Finanzbestimmungen bei 
„bank runs“ ähnlich der momentanen wirtschaftlichen Krise. Diese Arbeit untersucht historische 
Beispiele von „bank runs“ sowie einige historische Beispiele die die Diskrepanz zwischen der 
Theorie und den praktischen Erfahrungen darstellen. „Bank runs“ können gelegentlich isolierte 
Ereignisse sein, sind jedoch oft die Vorboten grösserer  internationaler Probleme, wie in 1873 
oder in den frühen 1930ern. Historische Beispiele haben gezeigt, dass Regierungen und 
Aufsichtsbehörden in der Lage sind Probleme zu lösen die schon mal vorgekommen sind, wie 
z.B. die „Savings and Loan Crisis“ in den späten 80ern, sie jedoch weniger erfolgreich waren bei 
dem antizipieren der Resultate der Veränderung von Bestimmungen und technologischer 
Veränderung, wie z.B. das zunehmen der Kreditderivate und der hypothekarisch gesicherten 
Wertpapiere. Folglich wäre es sicher sinnvoll sich genauer mit modernen Bankpaniken 
auseinander zu setzen um ein besseres Verständnis über das zusammenwirken von 
Finanzmärkten und Finanzintermediärs zu erlangen.  
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